Regulating Banking Ethics: A Toolkit
David Zaring*
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the financial crisis, a dizzying array of new tools were
given to regulators to prevent the next disaster from happening, or at least
from happening in quite as destabilizing a way. In addition to new capital
requirements; agreed-upon leverage rules; new ratio requirements for the
relationship between assets and both long-term and short-term funding;
and different tools for overseeing the derivatives markets and the orderly
resolution of large financial institutions, regulators also announced that
there would be some softer initiatives.
The most prominent of these has been the effort to make banks more
ethical through government oversight. Often this has been characterized
as an effort to change the culture of financial institutions, and frequently
neither ethics nor culture has been well defined.
Nonetheless, the new approach is a real departure. Overseeing ethics
and culture represented a change of tack by regulators who used to focus
above all else on bank balance sheets and credit risk—tangible, often
mathematical exercises in accounting and risk mitigation. Regulating
culture is different. It is amorphous, depends on industry cooperation, and
has nothing to do with math.1 Make bankers act more ethically, regulators
reasoned, and they would be less likely to cut corners, evade regulation,
and destabilize their own or other institutions.
As John C. Williams, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (New York Fed), explained in 2018, capital and other regulations are
a necessary component of financial oversight but “far from sufficient. The
danger we face today is that people may conclude that the hardened
defenses are enough, and other supervisory activities around culture,
* Professor at the Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Christina
Skinner and to Jennifer Corcoran, Lani Matsumiya, and Michelle Mohr for research assistance.
1. For a discussion, see Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture
and Ethics in Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 205–07 (2013) (“Framing policy
debates around seemingly inchoate concepts like culture and ethics is thus often, and understandably,
viewed as somewhat impractical.”).
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conduct, and governance are superfluous.”2 For these reasons, Williams
said, “We must stay vigilant around the ‘softer’ side of supervision. Strong
culture and robust corporate governance are our first lines of defense.”3
The New York Fed was a pioneer in emphasizing the importance of culture
in regulating banks. Williams’s predecessor, William Dudley, made it a
central feature of his approach to regulatory reform.4
However, U.S. institutions have not been alone in their scrutiny of
banking ethics. Australia convened a “Royal Commission into Misconduct
in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry,” and in
2018, it concluded that cultural change was essential. The Commission
recommended that Australian regulators “build a supervisory program
focused on building culture that will mitigate the risk of misconduct” as a
component of their ordinary prudential supervision of banks.5 Europe has
also signed on to the idea, urging banks to take a proactive role in
implementing an ethical culture and warning them that regulators would
be on the cultural case. As European Central Bank Supervisory Board
Chair Danièle Nouy has observed, “[t]he people who manage a bank can
shape the culture and behavior of the entire organization. That is why
supervisors keep a close eye on who becomes a bank manager.”6
International institutions have also gotten involved. After the
financial crisis, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), in concert with the G20 and the Financial Stability
Board, developed its “High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer
Protection,” which included criteria for responsible business conduct.7 The
2. John C. Williams, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at Governance
and Culture Reform Conference: Now Is the Time for Banking Culture Reform (June 18, 2018), https:
//www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2018/wil180618 [https://perma.cc/XPC6-ZWDA].
3. Id.
4. William C. Dudley, Former President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the
Banking Standards Board: Reforming Culture for the Long Term (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.
bis.org/review/r170321d.htm [https://perma.cc/H4LJ-HGDF].
5. KENNETH M. HAYNE, COMMONWEALTH, 1 FINAL REPORT: ROYAL COMMISSION INTO
MISCONDUCT IN THE BANKING, SUPERANNUATION AND FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 37 (2019),
https://www.royalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-02/fsrc-volume-1-final-report.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/F4A5-3EPN].
6. Danièle Nouy, Chair, Supervisory Bd. of the European Cent. Bank, Speech at the 7th Congress
of the Solvay Schools: Ethics in Banking from Gordon Gekko to George Bailey (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2018/html/ssm.sp181015.en.html
[https://perma.cc/7Z83-6D4S]; see also Sabine Lautenschläger, Member, Exec. Bd. of the European
Cent. Bank, Speech at the 14th Asia-Pacific High-Level Meeting on Banking Supervision: Risks to
Banks - From Inside and Out (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/
html/ecb.sp190213~eab73a449d.en.html [https://perma.cc/TPR6-SJLG] (“[T]he onus is on the banks
and their stakeholders to bring about a cultural shift.”).
7. Gert Wehinger, Banking, Ethics and Good Principles, OECD OBSERVER (2013),
http://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/4017/Banking,_ethics_and_good_principles_.html
[https://perma.cc/9RQV-SQXF].
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Financial Stability Board in 2018 also published a seventy-eight page
paper on “Strengthening Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct
Risk: A Toolkit for Firms and Supervisors.”8 The report identified
seventeen such tools designed to realize three goals: changing the culture
of banks, emphasizing the individual responsibility of bankers for
wrongdoing, and addressing the problem of bankers who leave one bank
under a cloud of suspicion and then find work at another bank, bringing
suspect values along with them.9 Bank of England Governor and former
Financial Stability Board Chair Mark Carney has called this last issue the
“rolling bad apples” phenomenon and has decried it, among a myriad of
other problems, as related to the ethics of financial institutions.10
There is little doubt that culture matters for institutions—entities
ranging from economics departments to soccer teams spend plenty of time
thinking about the cultures they hope to foster—and that culture is also
exceedingly hard to measure or define.11 Regulators now have had a
decade since the financial crisis to operationalize their approach to guiding
and improving the ethics and culture of the banks they oversee.
Understanding what they have chosen to do makes it easier to assess the
value of the effort to make cultural transformation an important part of a
regulatory program. It also offers lessons to the broader world of public
administration, where some agencies, such as environmental regulators,12
have not made a culture of compliance a priority, while others—securities
regulators come to mind—have tried to do more to make certain values
stick.13

8. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS TO
MITIGATE MISCONDUCT RISK: A TOOLKIT FOR FIRMS AND SUPERVISORS (2018),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P200418.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ6M-HNS7] [hereinafter
STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS TO MITIGATE MISCONDUCT RISK].
9. See id. at 2.
10. Id. at 3.
11. See, e.g., Jim Taylor, Build a Positive and High-Performing Sports Team Culture, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (July 29, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-power-prime/201307/buildpositive-and-high-performing-sports-team-culture [https://perma.cc/K5AZ-NB52].
12. See generally ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WORKING TOGETHER F.Y. 2018–2022 U.S. EPA
STRATEGIC PLAN (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-02/documents/fy-20182022-epa-strategic-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4LS-LWXP].
13. The Securities and Exchange Commission has been described as a business ethics regulator.
See David Zaring, Financial Reform’s Internationalism, 65 EMORY L.J. 1255, 1307 (2016) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has said that a ‘primary objective of the federal securities laws’ entails the ‘promotion
of “a high standard of business ethics . . . in every facet of the securities industry.”’” (quoting Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186–87 (1963)). The SEC
recently promulgated Regulation Best Interest, which codifies the obligations of broker-dealers and
investment advisors to put the interests of others ahead of their own. See Regulation Best Interest: The
Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 33, 318 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240).

558

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:555

I. THE THEORY OF ETHICS REGULATION
Ethics regulators have tried to improve the culture of banks largely
by encouraging the banks themselves to take steps to improve their culture
in the way regulators would like. Behind that encouragement, however, a
range of initiatives can be found, ranging from bringing the banks together
to consider the question—the convening power—to certifying that senior
bankers are appropriate for the job—the credentialing power. A variety of
initiatives involving more of an imposition than calling a meeting, but not
quite as intrusive a regime as one requiring executive pre-approval, have
also been adopted in the effort to improve bank cultures.
There is a large array of activities that are or could be considered
cultural regulation, and so some distinctions must be made. Some
regulators include under “cultural change regulation” any binding rule
designed to deter already illegal conduct or to broaden the number of
bankers who can be held responsible for such conduct. These regulations
are designed to address illegality in the hope that cultural change at the
sanctioned institution will follow, but they could just as easily be
characterized as standard enforcement against institutions or individuals
with conflicts of interest or inadequate internal controls. It does not make
sense to view anti-fraud enforcement as a new sort of regulation, rooted in
driving cultural change, because financial regulators have been on the
lookout for fraud for years.
For example, a new Dutch ethics regulator has sanctioned bankers
for forging signatures and misusing private information—conduct that
would plainly be illegal in the past.14 Although the regulator appears to be
new, the matters being policed are regulatory classics.
Similarly, British regulators consider their Senior Manager and
Certification regime to be an important component of their culture change
efforts.15 But that regime makes senior managers responsible for
wrongdoing by subordinates in other parts of the bank—an extension of a
liability rule, even if it is one designed to incentivize senior managers to
create a culture of compliance throughout the bank.16 But the cultural
change is supposed to work by extending legal sanctions, which now apply
both to the banker who broke the law and to the senior manager who was
leading the bank when the banker broke the law.17
14. See infra Section II(D).
15. Senior Managers Regime: Approvals, BANK OF ENG. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/authorisations/senior-managers-regime-approvals [https:
//perma.cc/C8EB-5LFZ].
16. See infra Section II(E).
17. Senior Managers and Certification Regime, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (May 9, 2019),
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/senior-managers-certification-regime [https://perma.cc/4QRF-L4V5].
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I also exclude risk management from efforts to change culture,
though of course, a different risk management approach at a financial
institution could affect the culture of the firm. For example, many
American financial firms are now required to have risk management
committees at the board level; this reform has been characterized by some
as an effort to curb an overly risk-loving financial culture.18 But regulators
have long scrutinized the risk management programs at banks. The board
risk management committee initiative exemplifies this19 by creating a
channel at the board level for a risk management tool consistent with the
usual inclination of regulators to ensure that banks do not take dangerous
risks.
This sort of regulation does look different. As Cynthia Williams and
her co-authors have discussed, the Dutch National Bank (DNB or De
Nederlandsche Bank) has hired organizational psychologists to encourage
the development of healthy bank cultures.20 The DNB has created a
behavioral and culture unit within the supervisory group of the central
bank and issued a white paper on the “supervision of behavior and
culture.”21 The attention is soft; the DNB has expressed concern with the
so-called “tone at the top” of the bank as a critical way to make firms take
ethics seriously.22 And the DNB wants ethics to be more than a matter of
“box ticking.”23 All of this is a form of emphasis rather than a specific set
of requirements that might look to outside observers like regulation itself.
Regulatory strategies for obtaining cultural change can be placed
along a spectrum—a rough one, with plenty of regulatory initiatives that
touch on different parts of the spectrum at the same time—of softer to
harder measures.24 The lowest key approach to cultural improvement
18. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2018);
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, DODD-FRANK ENHANCED PRUDENTIAL STANDARDS MATERIALS 7–
8 (2010), https://www.davispolk.com/files/Dodd-Frank_Act_Sections_165_and_166.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/Q44Z-2JNP].
19. See DELOITTE, RISK COMMITTEE RESOURCE GUIDE FOR BOARDS (2012), https://deloitte.
wsj.com/cfo/files/2012/07/risk_committee_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF89-E4YR].
20. For a nice discussion, see John M. Conley, Lodewijk Smeehuijzen, Cynthia A. Williams &
Deborah E. Rupp, Can Soft Regulation Prevent Financial Crises?: The Dutch Central Bank’s
Supervision of Behavior and Culture, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 773, 774, 780 (2019).
21. See DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE: FOUNDATIONS,
PRACTICE & FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS (2015), https://www.dnb.nl/binaries/Supervision%20of%20
Behaviour%20and%20Culture_tcm46-334417.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DR4-CANA].
22. Conley et al., supra note 20, at 795.
23. Id. at 799–800.
24. For overviews, see DELOITTE, BUILDING WORLD-CLASS ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS: MAKING A GOOD PROGRAM GREAT: FIVE INGREDIENTS FOR YOUR PROGRAM (2015),
https://www2.
deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/no/Documents/risk/Building-world-class-ethics-and-compliance-
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comes when regulators use their convening power to require firms to think
about ethics. There is a component of information exchange involved in
this process, as well as an implicit threat of enforcement if culture
conferences produce no results. But the central idea is an invitation to
reflect on self-regulation, if you like. The New York Fed has regularly
deployed its convener powers at conference on banking ethics; it is the
form of regulation that most heavily relies on industry to take the lead in
attending to culture.25
This sort of best practices and benchmarking-style governance can
be further institutionalized. For example, the British Banking Standards
Board and American self-regulatory organization FINRA, both industrycreated institutions, have turned to such practices—the board through an
annual survey and FINRA through a variety of measures ranging from a
convening power to enforcement.26
Another popular approach—if quite strange—to improving culture is
the ascent of the oath in which regulators or industry require or encourage
members to swear to uphold a number of broad principles. Sometimes, as
in the case of the Netherlands, this oath can serve as a basis for
enforcement if broken.27
More onerous still is the information exchange that some regulators
call for, especially when it involves a requirement that the work histories
of bankers and other industry professionals be made available to the public
or scrutinized by firms before they can hire the banker. Such measures are
designed to prevent unethical bankers, forced out of their current banks
but not out of the industry, from spreading their practices to other
institutions.28
The most stringent—at least potentially—“soft” requirement
requires the pre-approval of the regulator before the banker can begin
working in the profession. The U.K. has created such a regime for senior
managers of its financial institutions.29 This gatekeeping role in some ways
changes what bank regulators do. Rather than enforcing rules against
unethical or illegal bankers, like a law enforcement agency, certification
programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VUD-C2AF]; MCKINSEY & CO., COMPLIANCE 2.0: EMERGING BEST
PRACTICE MODEL (2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/risk
/our%20insights/compliance%2020%20emerging%20best%20practice%20model/compliance_20_e
merging_best_practice_model.ashx [https://perma.cc/9A4H-BP8P].
25. James Hennessey, Senior Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at
Westminster Business Forum Policy Conference: We’re Only Human: Culture and Change
Management (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2019/hen190905
[https://perma.cc/E33D-6EXK].
26. See infra Section II(B).
27. See infra Section II(C).
28. See infra Section II(D).
29. See infra Section II(E).
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turns a financial regulator into a gatekeeper, like the Food & Drug
Administration, whose approval determines whether prescription drugs
can be sold.30
In what follows, this Article offers examples of these new initiatives,
ranging from softer to harder and again, with some such regimes hitting
more than one of the stations of the cross.
But first, some caveats. There are reasons to doubt that ethics
regulation can work. Changing culture, an organic thing, from the outside
is something that anthropologists have long deemed challenging.31 The
goals that financial regulators seem to want to achieve through ethics
regulation—putting the interests of the customer first and getting banks to
act like a semi-private provider of a public service—would turn part of
banking regulation into a professional responsibility regime—the kind that
doctors, lawyers, and accountants all labor under. But financial institutions
only partly fit the professional model.32 Some of their employees provide
advice, like lawyers, but others are nothing more than salesmen of money.
Financial intermediation is a public good deeply entwined with state
finance, but bankers are not officers of the court or the first line of defense
against an epidemic, like lawyers or doctors, and it is not clear that they
should be treated in the same way.33
Viewed most pessimistically, the turn to culture and ethics can look
like a sign that regulators have given up on the hard work of making smart
financial types comply with rules they would just as soon not follow and
are now seeking the help of frequently noncompliant industry to do it. In
turn, this can look like greenwashing34—banks are distrusted and
unpopular, and loud proclamations that their overseers are going to ensure
that they act in a principled, ethical way going forward might turn out to
be good for their image.

30. Some scholars have suggested that more FDA-like gatekeeping would be welcome in the
financial markets. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex
Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 66 (2012) (arguing that a “potentially effective form of
such ex ante regulatory control is pre-market government licensing of complex financial
instruments—including derivatives, asset-backed securities, and other structured products”).
31. Gwendolyn Gordon & David Zaring, Ethical Bankers, 42 J. CORP. L. 559, 575 (2017).
32. For an exploration of this and a case showing that investment bankers often do act with a
duty of loyalty to their clients (as opposed to, presumably, traders), see Andrew F. Tuch, Banker
Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (2016) (arguing that “M&A advisors
are properly characterized as fiduciaries of their clients and counters alternative conceptions of their
role”).
33. Id. at 1105.
34. Will Kenton, Greenwashing, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.investopedia.
com/terms/g/greenwashing.asp [https://perma.cc/RPP6-S568].
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II. THE NEW TOOLS USED TO IMPLEMENT CULTURAL REFORM
A. The Convening Power of Regulators
In what probably constitutes ethics regulation’s lightest touch, the
banking regulators have tried to get financial institutions to self-regulate
on ethics through nothing more than emphasis through speeches and
meetings. For instance, in 2018, Executive Vice President of the New
York Fed Kevin Stiroh addressed some ways to address ethical failures in
the banking culture. He recommended “engaging with diverse
thinkers . . . to better understand the complexity of culture reform” and
“facilitating discussions among the supervisory community on assessing
and influencing industry culture-related efforts.”35 These could be
supplemented, in his view, with conferences and workshops among
academic experts and regulatory and industry representatives on culture
reform. They could also be supplemented by building a relationship
between business schools to train future financial market professionals in
good culture and writing about the issue in white papers and the like.36
These sorts of conferences and meetings have become, if anything,
standard tropes of ethical compliance. The New York Fed has held a
number of high-level, two-day meetings with executives at large banks at
which it pushed them to establish a “culture of compliance” with an ethical
tone from management.37 William Dudley, the former president of the
New York Fed, and a particular proponent of improving the culture in
banks, thought that “career progression is as important as
compensation. . . . The key point is that firms need to take a hard look at
how they reward employees.”38 To Dudley, the right incentives could be
realized through bonus calculations, which could be tied to lawabidingness as well as productivity.39
35. Kevin J. Stiroh, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve of N.Y., Remarks at the 4th Annual
Culture and Conduct Forum for the Financial Services Industry: Complexity of Culture Reform in
Finance (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2018/sti181004 [https:
//perma.cc/ZWC5-9D58].
36. Id.
37. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., REFORMING CULTURE AND BEHAVIOR IN THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES INDUSTRY: PROGRESS, CHALLENGES, AND THE NEXT GENERATION OF LEADERS (2018),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/governance-and-culture-reform/2018-NewYork
Fed-Culture-Conference-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/78ZZ-RVKU].
38. William C. Dudley, Former President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Speech at Federal Reserve Bank of New York: Strengthening Culture for the Long Term 3–4 (June
18, 2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/governance-and-culture-reform/Dudleycultureconference-180618.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUH5-75D7].
39. Id. See generally Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670
(proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1232) (American regulators have concluded
that “[P]oorly structured incentive-based compensation arrangements can provide executives and
employees with incentives to take inappropriate risks that are not consistent with the long-term health

2020]

Regulating Banking Ethics

563

In the U.K., such conferences have become annual affairs, with
regulators and consumer advocates making the case at conferences of bank
executives.40
The goal is modest. By making ethics part of the agenda of meetings
involving both regulators and senior bankers, the regulators are
emphasizing that they take ethics seriously. The meetings can always be
supplemented with action later—former New York Fed President William
Dudley warned at one conference that if bank managers “as stewards of
these large financial institutions do not do [their] part in pushing forcefully
for change across the industry, then bad behavior will undoubtedly
persist. . . . In that case, financial stability concerns would dictate that
[their] firms need to be dramatically downsized and simplified. . . .”41 By
exploring new approaches at these meetings—including some of the ways
discussed later in this chapter—regulators can encourage self-regulation
by industry. It is an approach that encourages financial institutions to
address ethics without requiring anything of them except attendance and
consideration, ideally followed by some internally generated reforms.
B. Best Practices and Benchmarking by Industry
More taxing than discussing best practices at industry meetings are
regulatory requirements that industries develop such best practices.
Regulators interested in improving the culture of the banks they oversee
have often required this sort of best practices development, and now,
invitations to devise best practices have become common to the
burgeoning field of culture and ethics.42 In theory, identifying best
of the institution and, in turn, the long-term health of the U.S. economy”); EUROPEAN BANKING
AUTH., GUIDELINES ON SOUND REMUNERATION POLICIES 33 (2015), https://eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/1314839/EBA-GL-2015-22+Guidelines+on+Sound+Remuneration+Policies.pdf/1
b0f3f99-f913-461a-b3e9-fa0064b1946b [https://perma.cc/LK4A-NF4L] (European regulators have
joined this effort: “[A]ssess the mechanisms and systems adopted to ensure that the remuneration
system properly takes into account all types of risks, liquidity and capital levels and that the overall
remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and is in
line with the business strategy, objectives, corporate culture and values and the long-term interest of
the institution”).
40. See Gillian Guy, Chief Exec., Citizens Advice, Remarks at Financial Times Banking
Standards Conference: Improving the Professional and Ethical Conduct of Bankers—A Consumer
Perspective (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/improving-the-professionaland-ethical-conduct-of-bankers-a-consumer-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/D9MZ-EXBY].
41. William C. Dudley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks
at the Workshop on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Enhancing
Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20, 2014),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud141020a.html [https://perma.cc/M4U4AZVY].
42. For a discussion of best practices as a regulatory tool, see David Zaring, Best Practices, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 297 (2006) (“In a classic best practices scheme, regulated entities themselves
devise practices to comply with relatively unspecific regulatory requirements.”).
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practices can encourage firms to move towards the benchmark, after which
new best practices can be identified, and the process can iterate onward.43
However, as this sort of regulation is not mandatory, progress is by no
means assured.
1. The U.K.’s Banking Standards Board
The U.K. has sought to identify the best practices for banking culture
by tasking industry with the creation of an institution to study the question
and to regularly survey bankers to assess how they view the culture at their
employers.
In June 2013, the U.K. Parliamentary Commission on Banking
Standards published a report titled “Changing Banking for Good.”44 One
change proposed creating a “professional body for banking in the U.K.”45
In 2015, the banks responded by creating the Banking Standards Board.46
The board is a non-governmental entity funded by its members47 that
43. Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 763,
781 (2005) (“[T]he aim is not to achieve uniformity, but to pool information, identify best practices,
and compare solutions across locations.”).
44.
The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards is appointed by both Houses of
Parliament to consider and report on professional standards and culture of the UK banking
sector, taking account of regulatory and competition investigations into the LIBOR ratesetting process, lessons to be learned about corporate governance, transparency and
conflicts of interest, and their implications for regulation and for Government policy and
to make recommendations for legislative and other action.
PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD, 2013-14,
HC 175-II, at iv (UK), https://www.parliament.uk/documents/banking-commission/Banking-finalreport-vol-ii.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8Z3-TS7R].
45. PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD,
2013-14, HC 175-I, at 33 (UK), https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016
/03/banking-standards-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X22-K6HQ].
46. What Is the BSB?, BANKING STANDARDS BD., http://www.bankingstandards
board.org.uk/what-is-the-bsb/ [https://perma.cc/DYP7-WNVU]. For a discussion of the Libor
manipulation crisis and the cultural conditions existing prior to the proposal of the BSB, see Justin
O’Brien, Culture Wars: Rate Manipulation, Institutional Corruption, and the Lost Normative
Foundations of Market Conduct Regulation, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 375, 409–10 (2014) (“The
extraordinary testimony provided by senior bankers at RBS to the British Parliamentary Commission
on Banking Standards in February 2013 offers a compelling rationale to externally validate
protestations of commitment to cultural reform. . . . [T]he banking executives were, in turn, shocked
at the crookedness involved in the manipulation of Libor, dismayed at the lack of moral restraint, and
keen to differentiate between ethical bankers and amoral traders.”). For a discussion of the BSB’s
principle of the role of culture as a business input, see Saule T. Omarova, Ethical Finance as a
Systemic Challenge: Risk, Culture, and Structure, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 797, 818 (2018)
(“[F]inancial regulators successfully incorporated it into their rhetoric by emphasizing that ‘good
culture’ is in financial firms’ economic self-interest.”).
47.
The BSB is a self-described private sector body funded by membership subscriptions and
open to all banks and building societies operating in the UK. It is neither a regulator nor a
trade association; it has no statutory powers, and it will not speak or lobby for the industry.
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promotes best practices and encourages the exchange of information. Both
turn on its annual assessment, designed to provide insight to its member
banks into the current status of culture in the U.K. banking industry.48 The
assessment invites employees to evaluate how their firms fare on nine
characteristics:
openness,
reliability,
honesty,
competence,
responsiveness, organizational resilience, respect, accountability, and
shared purpose.49 The assessment is designed with the assistance of
academics and also includes a quantitative element. It is based on a thirtyfour question employee survey, from which the scores on the nine
characteristics come.50 The board also evaluates these characteristics
qualitatively through focus groups and interviews.51 The results are
aggregated at both the firm level and for all BSB members collectively so
that individual members are able to compare their performance to that of
other member banks, although many of these results are not shared with
the public.52
The board’s annual review and discussion of its assessment is more
public and describes the results of the survey on an aggregate basis. While
the 2017 survey results showed an improvement in culture as compared to
2016, the 2018 survey showed a slowing of improvements (as measured
based on the results of the assessment in aggregate).53 The board model
has had its share of cross-border appeal. In December 2017, the five largest
retail banks in Ireland announced plans to establish their own board, the
Irish Banking Culture Board.54 The board launched on April 15, 2019, and
will also conduct an annual survey on the state of banking culture in that
country. In America, Stiroh, the New York Fed official, has praised the
board as an institution that can, given the importance of “cultural capital,”

It will, instead, provide challenge, support and scrutiny for firms committed to rebuilding
the sector’s reputation, and it will provide impartial and objective assessments of the
industry’s progress.
What Is the BSB?, supra note 44.
48. The board says that its proprietary employee survey is designed to “build a picture of how
far individual firms, and firms collectively, demonstrate characteristics . . . associated with good
organisational cultures . . . [and] promote continuous collective improvement.” BANKING STANDARDS
BD., ANNUAL REVIEW 2018–2019, at 10 (2019), https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/
pdf/banking-standards-annual-review-2018-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SE4-PTAK].
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Assessment Results 2018, BANKING STANDARDS BD., https://www.bankingstandardsboard.
org.uk/assessment-results-2018/ [https://perma.cc/SKS5-CXUQ].
52. Assessment Results 2017, BANKING STANDARDS BD., https://www.bankingstandardsboard.
org.uk/assessment-results-2017/ [https://perma.cc/F4KT-MSYP].
53. Id.
54. See generally Frequently Asked Questions, IRISH BANKING CULTURE BD., https://www.irish
bankingcultureboard.ie/faq/ [https://perma.cc/LL8Q-2K7E].
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provide insight into practices that banks can adopt to improve that
capital.55
2. FINRA’s Efforts to Promote Ethics in the Financial Industry
The U.S. has its own long extant self-regulatory organization (SRO),
and that organization has also adopted the idea of taking ethics seriously.
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has developed a
reporting requirement, has played a role as an ethics convener, and has
policed ethics as a traditional enforcer; the efforts fall in different parts of
our continuum of intensity of regulation, but one of those initiatives has
required surveys of its membership, as with the BSB, in an effort to
understand what works to improve culture and to convey that information
to the industry. FINRA developed the BrokerCheck database and thus has
tried to develop a user-friendly way to offer clients information about their
brokers and investment advisers, including information about prior
disciplinary proceedings. BrokerCheck was first introduced in 1998,
making FINRA a relatively early adopter of one approach banking
regulators have highlighted to deal with the rolling bad apples problem.56
Today, BrokerCheck includes information about nearly 630,000 registered
representatives and 3,600 securities firms across the United States.57
Like the U.K.’s Banking Standards Board, FINRA has also sought to
provide its members with information about best practices, even though it
has not, so far, tried to do so via a comprehensive, repeated survey of
financial professionals. FINRA has, however, offered its members
guidance on establishing, communicating, and implementing cultural

55.
The BSB, for example, provides one lens on assessing culture change for a broad crosssection of financial services firms operating in the U.K. Each firm participating in the
survey has the ability to see its outcomes relative to others and the industry average. This
type of industry-wide assessment gives firms insight into areas they can individually focus
on, as well as areas they may want to address as an industry.
Kevin J. Stiroh, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the GARP Risk
Convention: Reform of Culture in Finance from Multiple Perspectives (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2019/sti190226 [https://perma.cc/4UTH-ZZWD].
56. See Press Release, FINRA, New, Improved NASD BrokerCheck Goes Live Online Today
(Mar. 19, 2007), https://www.finra.org/media-center/news-releases/2007/new-improved-nasdbrokercheck-goes-live-online-today [https://perma.cc/GVN4-VME4].
57. Statistics, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/newsroom/statistics [https://perma.cc/K4YL8W
BU].
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values,58 and it has held a conference on building and maintaining an
ethical culture.59
FINRA has always played an important role in sanctioning industry
professionals who run afoul of its rules, and here too, it has tried to use the
language of ethical improvement in its enforcement. Between 2014 and
2018, FINRA filed over 6,000 disciplinary actions, including expelling
over 100 firms and barring over 2,000 individuals from the industry.60 As
we have seen, when it comes to enforcement actions, much of what gets
labeled as ethics enforcement looks like the kind of enforcement that
would be done even if regulators never spoke about ethics or culture. But
FINRA is different, if only a little, because of how explicitly it has
highlighted its goals of cultural improvement and its long tenure as a
policer of ethics-like conflicts of interest and consumer protections.
FINRA indicated in 2016 that one of its enforcement priorities would
be to determine how firms would “establish, communicate and implement
cultural values, and [determine] whether cultural values are guiding
business conduct.”61 It sanctioned a number of compliance officers at
firms for failing to adequately police or deter misconduct during this
period, which some in the industry took as evidence of an effort to improve
the compliance culture at firms.62
58. Targeted Examination Letter on Establishing, Communicating and Implementing Cultural
Values, FINRA (Feb. 2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/targeted-exam-letter/
establishing-communicating-and-implementing-cultural-values [https://perma.cc/L25C-B49F].
59. PATRICIA ALBRECHT ET AL., FINRA, BUILDING AND MAINTAINING AN ETHICAL CULTURE
(2018), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2018_AC_Ethical_Culture.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR
8Y-YB87].
60. Statistics, supra note 57.
61. HARDY CALLCOTT & EMILY CULBERTSON, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, FINRA IS CONCERNED
ABOUT FIRM CULTURE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? (2016), https://www.sidley.com/~/media/publications
/law360_finra-is-concerned-about-firm-culture_what-does-it-mean.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MM3K8E7S].
62. See Blackrock Advisors, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 1800501 (Apr. 20, 2015)
(order instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings) (investment adviser CCO
Bartholomew Battista did not force portfolio manager to disclose a conflict of interest and was
sanctioned for FINRA Rule 206 violations); In re SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt. Enterprises, Inc.,
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 4116, 2015 WL 3653814 (June 15, 2015) (order
instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings; sanctioning investment adviser CCO
Eugene Mason for FINRA Rule 206 violations by failing to implement compliance policies to detect
misconduct); In re Thomas R. Delaney II, Initial Decision Release No. 755, 109 SEC Docket 962 (ALJ
Aug. 17, 2015) (broker-dealer CCO Thomas Delaney who caused business to violate Reg SHO 1,500
times); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Off. S. Dist. N.Y., Acting Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces
Settlement of Bank Secrecy Act Suit Against Former Chief Compliance Officer at Moneygram for
Failure to Implement and Maintain an Effective Anti-Money Laundering Program and File Timely
SARS (May 4, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/acting-manhattan-us-attorneyannounces-settlement-bank-secrecy-act-suit-against-former
[https://perma.cc/FRY9-FLGR]
(FinCEN sanctioned chief AML officer Thomas E. Haider of money transmitter for failing to design
an effective AML program).
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Moreover, many FINRA actions have been brought under its
longstanding Rule 2010, which provides that a FINRA “member, in the
conduct of its business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor
and just and equitable principles of trade”—a standard fairly brimming
with concern about culture.63 The organization’s own appellate body has
characterized Rule 2010 as “a broad and generalized ethical
provision . . . sufficiently wide to encompass any unethical, businessrelated conduct.”64 In fact, Rule 2010 is the most commonly invoked
FINRA rule and allows the regulator to “capture conduct that cannot be
efficiently or easily proved to violate another rule but that FINRA believes
is worthy of sanction.”65 FINRA has used the rule to sanction individuals
who made material misrepresentations and omissions in a company’s
public filings,66 a company that altered customer-related information after
the customer complained about the suitability of a recommendation,67 and
a firm that failed to maintain the required minimum net capital required by
the Securities Exchange Act.68
These cases, like many enforcement cases, fall into the category of
being sanctionable for failing to meet high standards of “commercial
honor,” but also for failing to meet straightforward conflict of interest and
lack of internal controls standards. According to FINRA’s Sanction
Guidelines, Rule 2010 remedies are to be deployed to protect the investing
public by deterring misconduct and upholding high standards of business
conduct; to be more severe for recidivists; and to be applied with
consideration of sanctions imposed by other regulators or previous
corrective action imposed by a firm based on similar conduct.69

63. FINRA MANUAL R. 2010 (2008); see also John Curley, FINRA Rule 2010: A Short Rule with
a Long Reach, THINKADVISOR (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2018/08/31/
finra-rule-2010-a-short-rule-with-a-long-reach/?slreturn=20190430212401 [https://perma.cc/HV6FWPXK].
64. Disciplinary Proceeding, OHO Order 16-03 (2015044379701) (FINRA Jan. 28, 2016) (order
denying motion to dismiss), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/OHO_Order16-03_2015
044379701_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRY2-DLM6].
65. William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 62 (2013); see also Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 101, 121 (2014) (noting that Rule 2010 is “referred to as the ‘just and equitable’
requirement, this rule is FINRA’s most commonly invoked rule”).
66. FINRA, DISCIPLINARY AND OTHER FINRA ACTIONS 1, 9 (2019), https://www.finra.org/sites
/default/files/publication_file/Disciplinary_Actions_June_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS3X-4ZFJ].
67. Id. at 14.
68. FINRA, DISCIPLINARY AND OTHER FINRA ACTIONS 1, 15 (2019), https://www.finra.org/
sites/default/files/publication_file/Disciplinary_Actions_February_2019_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3
VL-LV3P].
69. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES 2 (2017), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2017
_Sanction_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH3L-6MKN].
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FINRA has found the scope of its cultural enforcement program to
be hard to define, which has led to industry complaints about
unpredictability. Some observers have concluded that the organization’s
2018 enforcement priorities letter “may signal a shift in FINRA priorities
to more tangible areas for enforcement moving forward, perhaps in
response to the feedback that many found the agency’s requirements
related to ‘culture’ difficult to quantify, and therefore difficult to manage
toward.”70 The SRO has since devoted more efforts to identifying rolling
bad apples, consistent with the priorities of banking regulators in other
contexts.71
C. Oaths
Other regulators have tried to change the values of financial
institutions by making them swear allegiance to particular ethical
principles and, in the case of the Dutch in particular, to hold them to
account if they fail to follow those principles.
The Dutch Banking Association requires all Dutch bankers to swear
an oath.72 All 90,000 bankers working in the Netherlands were required to
adopt the oath by the start of 2015.73 The oath consists of eight “integrity
vows,” including a commitment by each banker that they will know their
“responsibility to society” and that they “will make every effort to improve
and retain trust in the financial sector.”74 The oath concludes with a
requirement that the banker appeal to a deity or make a solemn promise:
“So help me God! This I pledge and promise!”75
The Dutch Banker’s Oath is subject to enforcement, ranging from
reprimands, to fines that max out at €25,000, to a three-year maximum

70. Alex Russell, FINRA 2017 Priorities: Regulator Moves Away From “Culture of
Compliance”, BATES GROUP, LLC (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.batesgroup.com/news/finra-2017priorities-regulator-moves-away-from-culture-of-compliance [https://perma.cc/38V9-TCMU].
71. See Regulatory Notice 18-15, Guidance on Implementing Effective Heightened Supervisory
Procedures for Associated Persons with a History of Past Misconduct, FINRA (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/18-15 [https://perma.cc/MS95-ZMYP]; Robert W.
Cook, President & CEO, FINRA, Speech at Georgetown University McDonough School of Business:
Protecting Investors from Bad Actors (June 12, 2017) (“[I]n the last few years we have initiated more
targeted efforts to better identify and supervise those firms and individual brokers who may pose the
greatest risk of harm to investors—or ‘high-risk’ firms and brokers.”), https://www.finra.org
/newsroom/speeches/061217-protecting-investors-bad-actors [https://perma.cc/5TUY-2TT3].
72. Joe Pinsker, Would a Hippocratic Oath for Bankers Lead to Better Behavior?, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/would-ahippocratic-oath-for-bankers-lead-to-better-behavior/383867/ [https://perma.cc/Y5SC-J4UZ].
73. Id.
74. See The Banker’s Oath, TUCHTRECHT BANKEN, https://www.tuchtrechtbanken.nl/en/thebankers-oath [https://perma.cc/JH8B-HTMD] for the full text of the Dutch Banker’s Oath.
75. Id.
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moratorium on working anywhere in the Dutch banking industry.76
Enforcement matters are heard by the Foundation for Banking Ethics
Enforcement (in Dutch, the “Stichting Tuchtrecht Banken”), which was
set up in 2015.77 Since then, the entity has indeed considered some
enforcement measures—thirty such matters in the two years since its
founding, ten of which involved the forging of customer signatures, and
four involving the unwarranted review of customer data.78 In most of these
cases, the regulator handed down industry bans lasting between six to
twenty-four months, depending on the case and misconduct in question.
Although the Dutch Banker’s Oath is perhaps the best known and
most widely applied oath rolled out in the wake of the financial crisis, it is
not alone. An Australian nonprofit devised a simple oath that bankers
could voluntarily take; it also consists of a list of commitments, including
commitments to “serve all interests in good faith” and to “pursue my ends
with ethical restraint.”79 Oath takers are listed on a public website; over
1,000 Australian bankers have signed on, though that comprises a small
proportion of the Australians employed by the country’s banking
industry.80 Japan Financial Services Authority employees have been
reminded that they are expected to operate “for the sake of the nation and
its people” and to “meet the expectations of the people.”81 The British
banking industry also considered, but ultimately decided against, requiring
bankers to take an oath.82 In the U.S., the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency requires bank directors to affirm that they will “diligently and
honestly administer the affairs of such association, and will not knowingly
violate or willingly permit to be violated any of the provisions.”83
76. About the Foundation for Banking Ethics Enforcement, TUCHTRECT BANKEN,
https://www.tuchtrechtbanken.nl/en/about-the-foundation-for-banking-ethics-enforcement [https://
perma.cc/ADL2-8XG4].
77. Code of Conduct for Bankers Takes Effect in the Netherlands, EURONEXT (Jan. 4, 2015),
https://www.euronext.com/en/about/media/bell-ceremony-archive/code-conduct-bankers
[https://
perma.cc/237U-CK2K].
78. For the full collection of rulings, see Rulings, TUCHTRECHT BANKEN, https://www.tuchtrecht
banken.nl/en/verdicts/year/field_verdict_type/verdicts-disciplinary-committee-1 [https://perma.cc/W
L4A-9H5F].
79. Current Signatories, BANKING & FIN. OATH, http://www.thebfo.org/The-Oath/Signatories
[https://perma.cc/D6CM-2MXJ].
80. Rod Myer, The Bankers’ Oath That Can’t Be Enforced and Has Never Rubbed Out a
Member, NEW DAILY (Feb. 15, 2019), https://thenewdaily.com.au/money/finance-news/2019/
02/14/the-bankers-oath-that-cant-be-enforced/ [https://perma.cc/2NBY-HTPQ].
81. JAPAN FIN. SERVS. AUTH., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, CHAPTER 2: SECTION 3, PART I
(translation on file with author), https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/paper/29/zentai/02.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HP9V-GXX4].
82. Paul Chisnall, A Banker’s Oath: Part of the Answer?, BBA (July 30, 2014), https://www.bba.
org.uk/news/bba-voice/a-bankers-oath-part-of-the-answer/#.XQqsl7xKg2w [https://perma.cc/9WV
X-8A7V].
83. 12 U.S.C. § 73 (2018).
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These oaths appear to be signaling devices, which are designed to
remind bankers of their responsibilities. Enforcement actions citing any of
the oaths as an underlying basis have been rare outside of Holland—and
apparently nonexistent in Australia, if the voluntary oath could even serve
as the basis for discipline.84
D. Using Information Against Bad Apples
Regulators have worried that bankers adept at circumventing rules
might be asked to leave their bank, but not the industry. Creating a
database—a blacklist, of sorts—of bankers who have engaged in
misconduct, and forcing banks to consult the database before hiring the
banker, is one way to improve a culture of compliance by making it more
difficult for noncompliers to remain employed in the industry.
Former New York Fed president Dudley thought that there might be
some merit to to the blacklist.85 Dudley urged the creation of “a database
of banker misconduct to combat the problem of ‘rolling bad apples.’”86
The effort to develop such a database has been one of the most common
cultural reform efforts taken on by regulators since the financial crisis.87
Developing such a database draws on some tools that regulators, who
often must disclose at least some of their enforcement actions to the public,
have long had. Many financial regulators have thus created reviewable
lists of former industry members subject to industry bars, if not always in
as convenient a format as BrokerCheck. The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) regularly sanctions securities fraudsters with
temporary or even permanent bans from the securities industry: it imposed
625 bars and suspensions of wrongdoers in fiscal year 2017 and over 650
bars and suspensions in fiscal year 2016, either permanently or for a period
of time.88
The self-regulatory organization’s list of disciplined brokers and
dealers is not entirely publicly available, but it is reviewable by firms and
regulators that are granted access by FINRA, and members of the public
84. Myer, supra note 80.
85. See William C. Dudley, Former President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: The Importance of Incentives in Ensuring a Resilient and
Robust Financial System (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches
/2018/dud180326 [https://perma.cc/6LJ6-ZJZF].
86. Id.
87. See generally David Zaring, The International Campaign to Create Ethical Bankers, 3 J. FIN.
REG. 187 (2017).
88. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ENF’T, ANNUAL REPORT: A LOOK BACK AT FISCAL
YEAR 2017, at 12, https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EM56-VNBP].
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can inspect parts of it, including the parts with the involuntary termination
records—through the BrokerCheck portal.89 FINRA has also compiled a
database of registered investment professionals who have passed FINRA’s
qualification standards.90 The database includes “registration records of
broker-dealer firms and their associated individuals including their
qualification, employment and disclosure histories.”91 Firms are obligated
to upload forms to the database whenever they terminate an employee; in
the forms, they must describe the reasons for the separation.92 The
database of individuals and firms can be accessed by members of the
public, who can view their broker’s disclosure history, including
regulatory and involuntary termination actions, number and type of
securities licensing exams passed, and years of experience.93
Other jurisdictions have implemented blacklists of bankers in the
wake of the financial crisis. As Bank of England Governor Carney
observed, Britain’s Prudential Review Authority “has introduced
requirements for regulated firms to provide employment references to one
another in a mandatory template when hiring Senior Managers. This
includes information on an individual’s conduct record, and their fitness
and propriety.”94 The Dutch—trendsetters when it comes to regulating the
ethics of bankers—also have a blacklist.95
Globally, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has made
recommendations as to how to implement a blacklist on the assumption
that the regulator may not have the power or desire to require it, but that
industry might adopt it of its own accord.96 In its toolkit on “Strengthening
Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct Risk,” the FSB
89. About BrokerCheck, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/investors/learn-to-invest/choosinginvestment-professional/about-brokercheck [https://perma.cc/D9VV-ENYU].
90. Id.
91. Central Registration Depository (CRD), FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/crd [https://
perma.cc/34Y6-Z4PB].
92. See About BrokerCheck, supra note 89.
93. Id.
94. Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., Remarks at the Banking Standards Board Panel:
Worthy of Trust? Law, Ethics and Culture in Banking 3 n.6 (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.bank
ofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2017/banking-standards-board-worthy-of-trust-law-ethicsand-culture-in-banking.pdf?la=en&hash=140DB30905F90F73DD6A1BADFF3E13BF931AB8E8
[https://perma.cc/C864-3QMC].
95. See generally First Measure by Disciplinary Commission for Dutch Banks: What Lies
Ahead?, CLIFFORD CHANCE BRIEFINGS, Dec. 2016, at 1, https://www.cliffordchance.com/content
/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2016/12/first-measure-by-disciplinary-commission-for-dutch-bankswhat-lies-ahead.pdf [https://perma.cc/S27Z-TPRC] (as this memo of the early work of the disciplinary
body in charge of applying the Dutch ethical code indicates: “Instead of the maximum term it has
imposed a 6 month disqualification from the profession, as the bank had already terminated
employment and blacklisted the employee”).
96. See STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS TO MITIGATE MISCONDUCT RISK, supra
note 8.
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developed five tools for firms and two tools for regulators, all designed to
deal with the problems created when unloved bankers find new homes.97
The recommendations tend, as international financial regulatory
recommendations often do, toward the banal. Firms are supposed to
communicate their conduct expectations consistently; enhance their
interviewing techniques; do thorough reviews of bankers before hiring;
reassess employee conduct regularly; and conduct exit reviews when
employees are encouraged to leave the bank.98 It is difficult to know who
would pound the table against such initiatives, at least in public.
Nor are the recommendations for national authorities and supervisors
more specific. They are instructed to supervise firm employment screening
practices and to “[p]romote compliance with legal or regulatory
requirements regarding conduct-related information about applicable
employees, where these exist.”99 The latter recommendation is supposed
to ensure that where it is possible to manage a blacklist, consistent with
privacy, due process, and employment laws, supervisors should try to do
it.
These are modest, even bland sorts of counsel, but they do reflect the
priorities of leading bank supervisors. The FSB did not have to emphasize
culture, and yet it took stock of cultural regulation in 2017 in a white paper
and devised the toolkit one year later, suggesting that it thought the
encouragement of a global body on culture might help.100
More generally, the recommendations exemplify the trust that
regulators can put on industry reporting. On the principle that reporting
can induce compliance, another implementation mechanism that has been
weighed by regulators is to require disclosure about ethics in culture in the
reports of publicly traded companies.101 As the U.K. banker David Walker
has put it, “[T]here is need for enhanced narrative reporting on culture.
This should be substantive, outlining fully the values set by the board with
an assessment of progress, presented with the same seriousness as the hard
numbers in financial reporting.”102 American banking regulators have
made the promulgation of a code of ethics something that weighs on their

97. See id. at 8.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See FIN. STABILITY BD., REDUCING MISCONDUCT RISKS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR:
PROGRESS REPORT TO G20 LEADERS (2017), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Misconductprogress-report-July-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAW3-ALLR].
101. See Sir David Walker, Looking to Leadership for Continuity on Culture, MEDIUM: FED.
RES. BANK OF N.Y. (June 8, 2018), https://medium.com/new-york-fed/looking-to-leadership-forcontinuity-on-culture-344d68023598 [https://perma.cc/JH64-CGJS].
102. Id.
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assessment of the quality of the management of the bank, which, if not
exactly encouraging reporting, encourages a degree of promulgation.103
E. Certification
One of the most stringent ways to ensure that financial institutions
are managed by people with appropriate qualifications and of good
character is to require firms to certify this, and for regulators to approve
the certification. The requirement changes the role of the financial
regulator from an ex post enforcer of regulations to an ex ante gatekeeper
like the Food and Drug Administration, which must establish, to its
satisfaction, that any new drug is “safe and effective.”104 Senior manager
certification has become an important part of the U.K.’s post-crisis
regulatory reforms; the pre-approval it requires from regulators has the
potential to seriously constrain firms as to whom they might hire.105
The U.K.’s Parliamentary Commission for Banking Standards
adopted a new Senior Manager and Certification Regime (SM&CR) on
March 7, 2016.106 The aim of the regime is to “reduce harm to consumers
and strengthen market integrity by making individuals more accountable
for their conduct and competence” by holding senior managers
accountable for misconduct by lower level officials, requiring preapproval of important bank managers by the U.K.’s financial regulators,
and applying a new set of conduct rules to all.107
Parliament passed laws adopting the regime in 2013 and 2016 in
amendments to the main U.K. financial services legislation, the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000.108 SM&CR was rolled out in March 2016

103. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002;
Correction, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110-01 (proposed Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 228, 229,
249).
104. For a discussion, see The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and
Effective, FDA (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/fdas-drugreview-process-ensuring-drugs-are-safe-and-effective [https://perma.cc/P4H6-WZFQ].
105. For a discussion of the senior manager regime, see Court E. Golumbic, “The Big Chill”:
Personal Liability and the Targeting of Financial Sector Compliance Officers, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 45,
88 (2017) (“The SMR, which was conceived in response to the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and
LIBOR rate-fixing scandals, is designed to ‘embed personal accountability into the culture’ of the UK
financial services industry.”).
106. A Look at the Senior Managers and Certification Regime, BANKING STANDARDS BOARD,
https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/a-look-at-the-senior-managers-certification-regime/
[https://perma.cc/WVB2-VQUN].
107. Press Release, Fin. Conduct Auth., FCA Outlines Proposals to Extend the Senior Managers
and Certification Regime to All Financial Services Firms (July 26, 2017), https://www.fca.org.
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[https://perma.cc/56UZ-C3YX].
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and was extended to all Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)-regulated
financial services firms on December 9, 2019.109
The pre-approval process means that senior managers at the financial
institution must be assessed by their firms as “fit and proper,” and they
must be approved by the Financial Conduct Authority on an annual
basis.110 A fit and proper manager is one who “has obtained a qualification;
has undergone, or is undergoing, training; or possesses a level of
competence; or has the personal characteristics; required by the general
rules made by the FCA.”111 Other financial professionals who have a
“significant impact on customers, the firm and/or market integrity” must
also be certified.112 This group includes proprietary traders; client-facing
advice-givers, such as financial advisers and investment managers;
material risk-takers; and those with responsibility for approving the
deployment of algorithmic trading strategies.113 The FCA’s pre-approval
standard—the fit and proper standard—has been characterized by British
regulators as an ethics regulation because it not only looks to the
professional qualifications of the senior managers and key employees of
financial institutions, but also because it allows for an evaluation of
bankers based on their character.114
Less clearly, “ethical” is the requirement that senior managers
prepare a “Statement of Responsibilities” that “must clearly describe all of
the[] responsibilities” for which the senior manager is responsible and
accountable.115 They are also subject to a “Duty of Responsibility,” which
allows the FCA to hold the manager responsible when the firm breaches
one of the FCA’s requirements upon a showing that the senior manager
did not take reasonable steps to prevent or stop the breach.116 This regime
was created partly from a sense that senior managers were not penalized
for wrongdoing elsewhere in their banks during the financial crisis, but it
should probably be understood as a liability rule expanding responsibility
109. Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SCMR), BNY MELLON PERSHING (Oct. 2,
2019), https://www.pershing.com/uk/en/news/what-is-big-in-our-world/regulation/smcr [https://per
ma.cc/5R25-G9QK].
110. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FIT AND PROPER TEST FOR EMPLOYEES AND SENIOR PERSONNEL
SOURCEBOOK 1.2.18 (2019), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/FIT.pdf [https://perma.cc
/TBK4-Z2CA].
111. Id. (italics omitted).
112. One Year to Go Before SM&CR Applies to All FCA-Regulated Firms, KATTEN MUCHIN
ROSENMAN LLP (Dec. 10, 2018), https://katten.com/One-Year-to-Go-Before-SMCR-Applies-to-AllFCA-Regulated-Firms [https://perma.cc/GAF5-VQSD].
113. See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 109.
114. See generally Zaring, supra note 87.
115. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., THE SENIOR MANAGERS AND CERTIFICATION REGIME: GUIDE FOR
FCA SOLO-REGULATED FIRMS 13–14 (2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/guide-forfca-solo-regulated-firms.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KF3-WSS7].
116. Id. at 14.
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for illegality beyond the bankers most closely associated with the illegal
conduct.
The conduct rules are a mixture of both liability and ethics rules. The
rules apply to all employees within a firm, not just those certified by the
firm and the FCA (though senior managers get their own set of rules).117
The purpose of the conduct rules is to “shape the culture, standards and
policies of firms as a whole and promote positive behaviors that reduce
harm.”118 The rules seem designed to reach matters that might be
considered ethics-related, especially those that apply to street-level
professionals. Those rules include acting with integrity; acting with due
care, skill, and diligence; being open and cooperative with regulators;
paying due regard to the interest of customers and treating them fairly; and
observing the proper standards of market conduct.119 Senior manager
conduct rules include ensuring that the business is controlled effectively
and complying with relevant requirements; that delegated responsibilities
are discharged effectively; and that the FCA or Prudential Regulation
Authority (PRA) is notified of any relevant information.120
The FCA’s Enforcement and Annual Performance Report 2017–
2018 recounts forty-eight culture and governance cases opened between
April 1, 2017, and March 31, 2018, while only two cases were closed.121
As of the publication of the report in 2018, there were sixty-one culture
and governance cases open, compared to fifteen the previous year.122 The
highest profile of these cases involved Jes Staley, the CEO of Barclays,
who was fined by the FCA and PRA jointly for failing to act with “due
skill, care and diligence” in attempting to identify the author of two
anonymous letters that disparaged a friend and colleague.123 The FCA
reasoned that Staley should have recognized a conflict of interest between
his desire to protect his friend and the best interest of the bank he led,
which benefits from information provided by whistleblowers. Staley was
assessed ten percent of his annual income as penalty.124
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Staley’s penalty is related to culture improvement, which at banks
has often involved supporting whistleblowers, but the retaliation, while
not the ordinary fraud now policed by the new Dutch ethics regulator,
might have been sanctionable under the pre-SC&R regime. That regime,
with its code of conduct, its extended responsibility, and above all, its preapproval process, has gone far into making ethical conduct a requirement
of banking.
CONCLUSION
One of the most interesting developments of the regulatory response
to the financial crisis has been the turn by regulators toward initiatives to
improve the ethics of the financial industry in a way that makes the
industry culturally more likely to comply with regulatory rules and avoid
taking on excessive risks. It is by no means clear that the effort to regulate
ethics will work, but what is clear is that regulators have made ethics a
priority such that they have turned to a number of different strategies to
operationalize a concept that has always risked being amorphous and
un-operationalizable.

